<p>We study ballot independence for election schemes:</p> <ul> <li> We formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence.</li> <li> We introduce a notion of controlled malleability and show that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also show that non-malleable ballots are sufficient, but not necessary, for ballot independence.</li> <li> We prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy under practical assumptions.</li> </ul> <p>Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions will enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.</p>
@inproceedings{2013-ballot-independence-for-election-schemes,
author = {Ben Smyth and David Bernhard},
title = {{Ballot secrecy and ballot independence coincide}},
booktitle = {ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security},
year = {2013},
month = {June},
volume = {8134},
pages = {463--480},
series = {LNCS},
publisher = {Springer},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-40203-6\_26}
}